To be, or not to be: Europe under siege

'We stay in Europe' rally in Athens, June, 2015. Demotix/ Chrissa Giannakoudi. All rights reserved.It has been a tough year for Europe. Greece, mass migration
and terrorism are among the many factors which have unsettled Europe in a
profound way. When the EU is seen to stutter and stumble from one crisis to
another, what the EU stands for, and what the EU is all about, are questions
that become of great significance. Perhaps it is just an end of year
reflection, but there does seem to be something profoundly cumulative about the
pressures on the EU.

Empires fall, countries collapse, and regimes break when
they come under multiple pressures which pile on difficulties of growing
complexity. When this complexity outstrips the steering capacity of such
entities they tend to crumble and give way to new historical forms. Is the EU
now in this position? When complexity outstrips the
steering capacity of such entities they tend to crumble and give way to new
historical forms. Is the EU now in this position?

Steering capacity comprises a number of different things. It
requires having the governance mechanisms to resolve pressing problems, and the
cultural and symbolic goods which bind a population together. In the case of
the European Union, its governance mechanisms have typically been well adapted
to a world of rising prosperity. The postwar boom assisted Europe’s development
such that all countries could rise simultaneously.

The European community was, moreover, bound together in the
postwar years because of two crucial social and symbolic experiences. The first
of these was the Second World War and its catastrophic legacy. The second was
the Cold War which gave Europe a strong sense of negative integration. But when
the Cold War came to an end and the threat of the Soviet Union was over, what
would bind Europe into the future? In the 1990s and early 2000s, faced with mounting
economic and social difficulties, the EU needed positive ideals and norms of
integration, such as commitments to social justice, sustainability and
well-being, which were too often either latent or absent.

Relying on the negative leads to difficulties, and when
things get tough and problems persist contested issues arise. Under these
circumstances, distributional struggles typically intensify, mutual gain gives
way to zero-sum, and the social order risks fragmentation and sectional
struggle.

The EU faces a series of crises which together threaten the
infrastructure of the Union itself and ask deep questions about its steering
abilities. In the first instance, the global financial crisis ricocheted
through Europe creating many years of economic strain, sluggish growth,
overhanging debts, and unemployment. As the global financial crisis became a Eurocrisis the balance
sheets of many European states became strained to breaking point. As the global financial crisis became a Eurocrisis the
balance sheets of many European states became strained to breaking point.

European
banks, buoyed by the fiction that risk had been equally distributed across the
Eurozone and beyond, had bought large amounts of public and private debt from their
neighbours and the US. As the economic crisis deepened, this debt became toxic
and in many cases worthless. European states stepped in to socialise this debt
and rapidly found their fiscal position in ruin. A vicious cycle of
austerity and protest followed. The era of financial deregulation had come home
to roost. If
the crisis raised questions about the economic competence of the EU, the recent
case of Greece created a watershed in EU economic and moral leadership. The
Kantian project of a peaceful union of states that had been at war with each
other for many centuries was premised on the Marshall plan which put resources
in place for an exhausted Europe. Yet in insisting that Greece face its
Versailles moment, the EU abdicated its moral vision in favour of punitive and
restricting covenants. The paradox of this is that the one country that
arguably benefited the most from the postwar settlement, Germany, became the
country that insisted on austerity for Greece and a punitive settlement.

Against this backdrop of economic pressure ‘European
society’ (which had reached its zenith in the mid-1990s according to
Euro-barometer data) began to experience intensifying contestation and division
along nationalistic lines. In insisting that Greece
face its Versailles moment, the EU abdicated its moral vision in favour of
punitive and restricting covenants. In Greece the Golden Dawn gained a
footing, in the UK UKIP rose to prominence, in France the National Front
captured much support, in Denmark the Danish People’s Party continues to grow;
and isolationist and xenophobic rhetoric became common place throughout the
region. It is against this background that politicians struggle to cope with
sudden and substantial migration flows into Europe; a struggle which compounds
the sense that the EU’s fragile system of social integration is under pressure.

While Chancellor Merkel’s commitment to opening the doors of
Germany to refugees may be seen as a heroic stand in the tradition of
humanitarian principles and human rights, this commitment is not shared by the
overwhelming majority of European countries. The result is a kind of
schizophrenia with respect to those who seek shelter in Europe. All EU attempts
to establish an effective policy towards migration have failed, as flows continue
to put pressure on multiple entry points into Europe from Spain to Italy, from
Hungary to Greece. Some of these pressures have now become so great that these
entry points are almost ungovernable. As hundreds of thousands of people pour
into Europe from the south and east, what was previously described as the
‘Mediterranean Crisis’ quickly became a larger European refugee crisis which
threatens to overwhelm existing EU policy.

A deeper paradox underpins the crisis of contemporary
migration in Europe. The flow of refugees are in many respects the other side
of the failed 9/11 wars and persisting instability throughout the Middle East
and North Africa. The flow of refugees are in many
respects the other side of the failed 9/11 wars and persisting instability
throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Although some European
countries stood against these conflicts, many did not. The utter failure of the
wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya created vacuums in these countries into
which brutal armed power has stepped. The people’s fleeing from North Africa,
Iraq and now Syria come to Europe for help. Europe bears a direct
responsibility for many of the catastrophic instabilities in their home
countries. Yet, with the exception of, for example Germany and Sweden, the EU
has buckled in the face of their suffering.

Many of the security challenges in the world as a whole are
now at Europe’s doorstep. Certainly, the terrorist violence that swept through
Paris signals new security dilemmas which the EU finds hard to address. There
is a significant discrepancy between the military capacity that Europe
possesses and relies on and the security demands facing the region in the twenty
first century. No amount of fighter jets and cruise missiles can prevent a
small group of armed men from storming a concert hall. And yet, we still hear
the eerily familiar war drums beating once again. Hollande’s call for a
“pitiless war” to be fought against ISIL is a desperate repetition of the
language we have come to know in the war on terror, so frequently uttered by
Blair, Sarkozy and others. The vicious cycle of violence from 9/11 to increased
airstrikes in Syria establishes an ever-escalating conflict and one which
becomes ever more distant from a political resolution.

But the problems go deeper. The decision to adopt a common currency in the
EU allowed a radical increase in European economic interdependence. Some of
this was planned and desired, such as the increase in intra-European trade and
investment. Other elements were not foreseen. Most fatefully, as already noted,
many large European banks began to collapse with consequences that ricocheted
throughout Europe. Enhanced economic interdependence requires significant
levels of political integration. Enhanced economic
interdependence requires significant levels of political integration. The
difficulty in the EU is that such integration runs into questions of political
feasibility.

In the
short run, it required German taxpayers to agree to guarantee the borrowing of
the Greek state and other debtor countries, and it required the debtors to
borrow and spend in a way that is acceptable to German taxpayers.

In the long
run, greater fiscal coordination is required at the EU level. For some, this
implies the EU’s capacity to enforce fiscal discipline. For others, it implies
the EU’s capacity for fiscal transfers. The divergence between these
perspectives is regularly on display in Brussels and across the continent.

Such
challenges, and any approach to finding effective solutions to them, rest on an
uncertain foundation of European governance. The bedrock of Europe is etched
with fault lines which under increasing pressure can quickly become fractures
between the many communities and political centres that comprise the EU.
Divisions open up within and between member states and threaten the promise of
a cohesive and harmonious Europe. The great projects of European cultural integration were above all projects of infrastructure and institution building. These are important, but they do not touch the fuzzy core of the complex patterns of national culture.

The EU, as
its critics have often asserted, was created by European elites, albeit
inspired by noble ideals. As the construct of elites, the EU has only had a
shallow pool of legitimacy which too often rested on EU outputs; that is,
economic success and stability. In democratic terms, the EU’s thin layer of
legitimacy has few roots in the political fabric of the societies of member
states. On top of this, many European decisions have all too often been the
result of the struggle between the most powerful political interests, and today
this increasingly takes the form of the interests of a dominant Germany. For
these and many other reasons, EU decision making is often seen as bureaucratic,
slow and difficult to accept, and far from accountable to EU citizens. Under
pressure, as the EU is today, there is a clear risk that the political
foundation of the whole project could come unstuck. 

European culture, like all cultures before it, cannot simply
be the result of elite efforts. It has to be
built on a foundation of common values and beliefs, which need to be cultivated
over the long term. There were opportunities to set down these roots in the
postwar period but they were rarely explored. It was easier for the leaders of
Germany and France, along with their allies, to shape Europe in their own image
and interest. European governance was always a compromise between the interests
of its leading powers and rarely, if at all, the product of wide scale
horizontal communication between peoples. The great projects of European
cultural integration were above all projects of infrastructure and institution
building. These are important, but they do not touch the fuzzy core of the
complex patterns of national culture.

This
recognition makes it difficult to maintain a vision of Europe as a Kantian
pacific union, as an example of pooled sovereignty and of how democratic rule
can be elevated beyond the nation state. It is important not to lose sight of
the fact that the EU has achieved much and, when times were good, went some way
towards realising these ideals. But when faced with current difficulties the
connective thread that binds the EU appears thinner and thinner.  What was envisioned by the architects of the
EU, and the elite celebrants of the project, was a thick and robust ideal of
Europe. Whether or not the EU is at a tipping point now remains to be seen.
Steering a way through the current constellation of crises is a sine qua non of
salvaging the EU project. With steering capacity under pressure this will not
be easy but recent EU attempts to reform and consolidate EU institutions may
help.

In the short term, Europe can only survive as a way of
solving common problems. This remains a Europe worth having insofar as the EU
stabilises crises and protects the economic wellbeing of its citizens. In the long run, however, the EU
cannot survive without its thicker ideals, because without them Europe will
have neither the political nor social integration to bind it together.

 

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