EU global strategy and the changing nature of conflicts

Federica Mogherini at a press confernce in the Netherlands, September 2016. Wikicommons/ EU2016 NL. Some rights reserved. The publication
of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) on 28 June 2016 by the EU’s High
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Federica Mogherini represents
the final result of a two year-long work that has involved extensive
consultations with EU member states, European experts and scholars, and third
countries representatives.

The
Global Strategy represents a much needed improvement on the European Security
Strategy (2003) which stated: “The violence of the first half
of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability
unprecedented in European history”. Given the
deteriorating geopolitical situation in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods
of the EU in recent years, it was obvious that this was no longer in touch with
realities on the ground.

However,
despite the Global Strategy’s recognition that the EU’s neighbourhood has
transformed from a ‘ring of friends’ into a ‘ring of fire’, it remains vague on
key concepts such as strategy, hybrid wars, and terrorism.

Generally
speaking, strategy entails the setting of clear-cut objectives, determining envisaged
implementation mechanisms and actions, and mobilizing the related resources needed
to achieve those goals. In short, a strategy generally describes why, how and
when objectives are to be achieved by the given resources. While the desired objectives
of the EU are well expressed in the EUGS, an explanation of the necessary (military,
political, ideational and economic) means is lacking, as is a clear
understanding of the kind of threats the EU is faced with.

For
instance, the document highlights the risk of hybrid wars, referring to the
kind of operations Russia has been conducting in Crimea. However, the document
does not specify what a ‘hybrid threat’ is, where it originates, and what kind
of means the EU would need to counter it. This is a serious shortcoming because
hybrid warfare could refer to two very different kinds of military operations.
First, a state could resort to hybrid warfare in order to avoid a direct
military confrontation with the enemy conventional forces using Special Forces,
local militias or contractors. Secondly, hybrid warfare refers to non-state groups
such as ISIS, Al Qaeda, Al Nusra and others that are hybrid because they mix the
use of advanced weapons (mainly missiles and drones) with conventional infantry
and terrorism tactics. Consequently, they blur regular
and irregular tactics, creating a “new” kind of
warfare in which terrorism becomes the main, but not the sole, fighting method.

Insurgent groups

As a
consequence, these non-state groups could not be simply defined as terrorist: the
notion of insurgent groups appears more correct. This is because, historically
speaking, every insurgent group has resorted to, at least to some extent,
terrorism as a tactic; militarily speaking, just because a group controls a
territory, its population, and its resources does not make it automatically a
terrorist group.

Instead
it rather is an insurgent movement that uses terrorist tactics according to its
objectives and based on the current tactical situation. The EUGS points precisely
to the risk linked to terrorism but seems to be rooted in a rather narrow notion
of terrorism and does not precisely indicate who is the enemy that resorts to
terrorist tactics, where exactly such an enemy operates, who its allies are and
how the enemy finances its operations.

To be
sure, defending EU citizens and interests from terrorist attacks is a priority
of EU policy but de facto this is just
a tactical response, and the EU urgently needs a more comprehensive and
proactive approach that would truly allow it to fight the actual insurgency and
the related geopolitical issues that fuel those terrorist attacks. Moreover,
this kind of approach would be consistent with the EUGS statement of investing in prevention and resolution of conflicts, avoiding
“premature disengagement”.

Promoting resilience

Focusing
on Africa and the Middle East, the EUGS commits to intensifying “its support
for, and cooperation with, regional and sub-regional organisations”, and for
this purpose it highlights the need to look beyond states and issues that are at
the front line of the EU’s neighborhood. The EUGS calls upon local and regional
actors and international organizations (e.g. the Arab League, the Gulf
Cooperation Council, and the African Union) to intensify collaboration, multilateral
cooperation, and to “promote resilience”.

Yet,
while such calls appear to be rather overdue and mutually beneficial, the EUGS
ignores other major issues in the southern neighbourhood, notably the conflict
in Iraq, the role of Kurds, of Shia militias, and of ISIS, thereby creating a
dangerous shortcoming to address in a comprehensive way the new geopolitics of
the area.

The EUGS
urges EU member states to invest more in cyber technologies and “in
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, including Remotely Piloted
Aircraft Systems, satellite communications, and autonomous access to space and
permanent earth observation”. Consequently, the EU strategy seems to envisage a
kind of conflict similar to those fought by the United States against irregular
fighters since 2001 using targeted killing operations. A precise definition of
targeted killing operations does not exist but they could be described as operations
that a state could enforce thanks to its drones and its intelligence
capabilities and that are destined to eliminate specifically targeted individuals.

Today such
operations take place extensively: Israel conducts them against Hamas; Russia does
the same against Chechen fighters; and the United States does it in their fight
against the Taliban, ISIS, al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups in multiple theaters
of war. This widespread recourse to such killing operations has several
grounds: it is convenient for governments with casualty-averse domestic
populations; it is considered morally preferable to conventional alternatives; it
is believed to disrupt
and degrade
terrorist organizations by keeping terrorists on the run,
reducing their ability to plot attacks, and eliminating skilled operatives.

The
last justification assumes that targeted killing operations are effective; however,
evidence about this presumed effectiveness is lacking. Moreover, the use of
drones has caused hundreds of civilian casualties – a development that has created
hatred towards this kind of weaponry and strategy. This is a key point because,
given that the EU needs a comprehensive approach, creating hate amongst local
populations is certainly counterproductive.

Finally,
in spite of the use of high-technology devices, the reality of current wars is
that they are still fought mainly by infantry, notably by foot soldiers that
engage in close combat on the ground. In fact, 81% of American casualties after
the Second World War are infantrymen; this is also true for EU member states
involved in violent conflicts; for example, all Italian soldiers killed in
action in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 were infantrymen from different army
branches. To be sure, investing in modern technology and in research and
development is a key asset. However, if the use of drone causes hatred and if
it cannot be considered a substitute of “boots on the ground”, as every recent
operation suggests, then a more enlightened policy would entail investment in
ways that provide improved training and fighting capabilities of infantry
troops (even using advanced technology), rather than investments in new and rather
costly state-of-the-art devices.

Closer cooperation

Lastly,
the EUGS highlights the need for closer cooperation between EU member states among
one another as well as between the EU and NATO, the latter of which “remains
the primary framework for most Member States”. Although this kind of call is
not new, today cooperation, at least at the logistical and research and
development level, is even more strongly recommended. EU member states
collectively spent some €200 billion on defense in 2015, but much of it is
wasted. For example, there are nineteen different types of armored infantry
fighting vehicles across EU member states, while the United States produces
just one type. Since every EU member state has its own political agenda,
strategic culture and geopolitical areas of interest, it is admittedly impossible
to have the same military requirements for weapons systems. Yet, projects like the
European Defence Action Plan and the European Defence
Research Program could help to strengthen military cooperation and thus
generate cost-reducing synergies.

In
conclusion, the EUGS represents a key strategic document for the EU and it
outlines convincingly the priorities
of the EU’s foreign and security policy. However, it suffers from serious
shortcomings regarding the definition of strategy, the notion of terrorism – much
more complex in reality than the document seems to presume – and the use of the
right military means to deal with the current security situation in the EU’s
neighbourhood and beyond.

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